From Totalitarianism to Cosmopolitanism: Issues of
identity in a Global Culture in Kawyne Anthony Appiah’s “Cosmopolitan Patriots”
and Jura Souranta and Tere Vaden’s “Wikiwolrd”
Both
Suoranta and Vaden in their e-book “Wikiworld” and Kwame Anthony Appiah, in his
article “Cosmopolitan Patriots envision a different world from the one we live
in today. Both argue for a uniquely different future of our world grounded on
cultural pluralism and shared culture. While Appiah’s sees a world connected by
a common culture grounded on cultural hybridization, Suoranta and Vaden see a
culture grounded on a shared technological culture. The similarities between
these two visions of the world abound and the differences are plenty as well.
But what both, intentionally or unintentionally, miss to mention seems more
important.
Similarities
Appiah sees a future world in “which
each local form of human life [is] the result of long-term and persistent
processes of cultural hybridization” (619). Appiah is arguing that “patriotism”
and “cosmopolitanism” do not have to be mutually exclusive but can be combined,
hence the title of his article. The essence of Appiah’s argument is that no
culture is created alone by itself but, as history has shown us, cultures are
created and eliminated by annexation, colonization, etc. So to him the concept
of cosmopolitanism makes perfect sense.
Appiah celebrates the fact that “that there are different local human ways of
being” (621), and this is at the core of cosmopolitanism. Appiah emphasizes the
fact that “human cultural difference is actively desirable” (621). For him
cosmopolitanism does not mean that every culture will become part of a global
cosmopolitan culture. He agrees that some cultural backlash might occur, and
this is perfectly fine as long as those cultures meet “certain general ethical
constraints as long, in particular, as political institutions respect basic
human rights” (621). In making this comment, Appiah urges us to pay attention
to those “political institutions” (621) that do not respect human dignity and
reflect on how culture was/is created in those places.[1]
For Appiah culture making and culture elimination are not mutually exclusive,
but part of the same cultural cycle:
. . . as forms of culture
disappear, new forms are created, and they are created locally, which means
they have exactly the regional inflections that the cosmopolitan celebrates.
The disappearance of old cultural forms is consistent with a rich variety of
forms of human life, just because new cultural forms, which differ from each
other, are being created all the time as well. (619)
Suoranta and Vaden see a similar view of the world in “Wikiworld”. For
them the one cultural constant today, and in the future, is technology (or to
put it more simplistic, the internet). For them the one constant among all the
young people all around the world are ICT’s, or information and communication
technologies. For them ICT’s promises to “deliver digital information to any place at any time” (Suorante and
Vaden 54). This digital revolution has the potential to create a shared
culture, like Appiah’s cosmopolitanism, around ICT’s. In Souranta and Vaden’s
own words “[t]his is the great democratic potential of digital technology”
(54).
For
Suoranta and Vaden “it is crucial to grasp the importance of focusing on the
use and development of technology that responds to the actual needs of the
people” (183), but people’s needs are never the same and are different for everyone.
This is where ICT’s come in. If we entertain the idea that “everyone
is a rooted cosmopolitan, attached to a home of one's own, with its own
cultural particularities, but taking pleasure from the presence of other,
different places that are home to other, different people” (Appiah 618) then I
would argue ICT’s come into play by fostering these relationships between
different people of different cultures. The overarching similarity between
these two concepts of the world is that both see the world as widely
interconnected. Both seem to announce a different world order coming in the
near future. While one (Wikiworld) seems more possible than the other, both
nevertheless hark to a semi-utopia of sorts.
Further similarities arise when
identity comes into the picture. Both pieces of work seem to agree that a broad
global culture will inevitably change the way individuals think of themselves,
their place in the world, and their relationship with those around them.
In Chapter 2 of Wikiworld titled “Digital
Literacy and Political Economy” the Souranta and Vaden argue that in a
consumerist, competitive society “individual is no longer the autonomous subject of enlightenment, but
rather a heteronomous postmodern chameleon and nomad, rearranging herself and
her identity according to the situation, always slipping from the pincers of totalizing
systems” (34-35). This is more obvious in the realm of ICT’s where individuals
can opt-out of their cultural identity. How does re-arranging one’s identity
lead to the end of totalitarianism? The concept of the “heteronomous postmodern
chameleon” sounds a lot like the cosmopolitan patriot, whose identity is not
created by her mother country but can be re-arranged and take on different
colors. Old pre-digital society had a totalizing effect, at least in those
un-capitalistic political institutions, and an individuals identity was
nothing more than a product of that
society. But now, at least according to the authors, an individual’s identity
will never be totalizing and concrete, but a mixture. Souranta and Vaden
comment on how “the centralized subject of totalitarianism and authoritarianism
is replaced by a multitude of voices generated by the immateriality of work in
the information age” (36). The information age does not just replace
totalitarianism, but also has the power to re-adjust the identities of those
individuals internally colonized in capitalistic societies.
Cheryl A. McLean in her
digital literacy study titled ““A Space Called Home: An Immigrant
Adolescent’s Digital Literacy Practices” argues that an “individuals'
identities come out of the active negotiation of a range of Discourses and
literacy practices across cultures and contexts” (14), In other words, cultural
identity is tied up with a whole host of different contextual discourses and
practices, much like the concept of cosmopolitanism, or to a larger extent
Wikiworld. Mclean argues that all these discourses and practices are being “used
by young persons to create transnational linkages and reinvent and position
their national identities” (15). I introduce McLean here to specify how
Souranta and Vaden’s theory of cultural identity is congruent with hers.
Both concepts of identity focus in how an external
factor (capitalist economy and digital literacies) can changed an individual’s
perception of herself in relation to others. It is important to showcase what
factors change and mold society as well as the individual. For example, if
“reality contains a virtual aspect that connects the seemingly solid everyday
objects to a necessary but invisible web of connections, influxions, and
investments” (Souranta and Vaden 35), then that virtual aspect of society has
to be accounted for. Who are the major players in this virtual aspect of
society? Who has a stake in this virtual reality? And so on. Souranta and Vaden
state that this is a “necessary” connection since we live in a consumerist
world and society. But does “necessary” connote “negative? What are the human factors involved in this
connection to this necessary reality? By connecting ourselves to this virtual
reality we are conforming our identity to an outer mechanism. Similarly, the
digital literacy practices
have forced Zeek to
modify, adapt, and conform her language use. However, in so doing, some core
aspects of her voice and identities are silenced. When individuals silence or
confine their language of intimacy, the practice brings with it another layer
of conflict: guilt and resistance associated with the use of the master
discourse. (17).
The
master discourse here of course is English, but this concept of the master
discourse can also be applied to that virtual reality mentioned above. Whether
its ICT’s or a lingua franca, digital literacy practices force you to mold your
identity for different circumstances.
Differences
The main difference between Appiah’s cosmopolitanism
and the concept of the Wikiworld is that the concept of the Wikiworld is
grounded on current cultural reality. By this I mean that Appiah’s concept of
cosmopolitanism strays too far into the utopian realm. He does not seems to
realize that not everyone will have the need, or desire, to be part a global
cosmopolitan culture, especially those internally colonized and he also refuses
to see how other facets that define our culture (besides nationhood), will play
a part in a global culture.
A case in point put forward by Simon Ortiz in his
narrative “Our Homeland, a National Sacrifice Area”. Simon Ortiz comments on
how the West was won at the expense of the Native American nation. For Ortiz
“Otherness” means hybridization, and hybridization for him has negative
connotations, as does homogenization. This is where Appiah and Ortiz are in
conflict. Take for example Appiah’s view of culture making form the above
quoted paragraph.
We can sense that Appiah
does not relate cultural elimination as negative or bad as long as it helps
create new cultures (in other words, homogenization) that foster cosmopolitan
ideals. By focusing on homogenization through a cosmopolitan prism, Appiah overlooks
the deeper problem of internal colonization and cultural subjugation. Ortiz
makes the dangers of homogenization explicitly clear. Ortiz acknowledges that
he cannot describe his feeling of “otherness”, but that it is a sensation
nonetheless (338). The sad irony is that the U.S., at least in the narrative,
has not come to terms with the internal colonization going on: “Government
bureaucrats / said Indians were insensitive / to U.S. heritage” (339). Clearly
for Ortiz culture homogenization is not congruent with a “rich variety . . . of
human life (Appiah 619), on the contrary it is consistent with cultural
purging.
Having just argued that culture making is not
in of itself a uniquely positive thing, let us now turn our attention to
Appiah’s concept of common culture and Ortiz’s relation to it. In his article
Appiah makes the point that “recognizing
that we in America are not centered on a national common culture is [. . .]consistent
with recognizing that (with, no doubt, a few exceptions) American citizens do
have a common culture (628). While it is true that Americans do not have a
common culture, it does not necessarily follow that because of this American
are sharing a non-existing common culture. It is those “few exceptions” (Appiah
628) that make an American common culture impossible. First of all, those few
exceptions will always exists and will continue to resist a common American
culture. The Native Americans in Ortiz’s narrative are an example of those
resistors and exceptions; they are the “national sacrifice” embedded in the
title of his work.
The above example of
Native Americans showcases how not everyone fits into Appiah’s concept of
cosmopolitanism. Furthermore, Appiah celebrates the fact that “that there are different local human ways of
being” (621), and this is at the core of cosmopolitanism. Appiah emphasizes the
fact that “human cultural difference is actively desirable” (621). For him
cosmopolitanism does not mean that every culture will become part of a global
cosmopolitan culture. He agrees that some cultural backlash might occur, and
this is perfectly fine as long as those cultures meet “certain general ethical
constraints as long, in particular, as political institutions respect basic human
rights” (621). In making this comment, Appiah urges us to pay attention to
those “political institutions” that do not respect human dignity and reflect on
how culture was/is created in those places (621)
What are those political
institutions that do not respect human dignity? Who are they? How are they
created? And who (which states) sustain these political institutions? Appiah
completely breezes by this concept and does not delve deeper into this problem.
Can it be possible that those Western cosmopolitans are sustaining those
inhuman political institutions by arguing for a global culture?
Suoranta
and Vaden know very well that the subjugation and elimination of cultures
should be accepted in the process of producing a global culture. In chapter 6
titled “Stages of Freedom” the authors start off the chapter strongly:
Behind the veil of a multitude of resistances and critiques, we should
see the shape of certain "unmoved movers" (proton kinun).
Capitalism is one of them; the particularities of the fight of developing
countries against prohibitive tolls and tariffs, of the fight of Indian rice
farmers against RiceTec and its patents, of the fight against privatization of water,
of the fight against liberating markets by armed force, constitute, in fact, a
generality: the generality of a capitalist mode of production. And do not even
the current ethnic conflicts point to the same: the decline and destruction of
local cultures is a continuation of the colonisation that swallowed Finland in
the 13th century and many other "peripheries" a lot later. These are
not a series of isolated aggressions, but a direct consequence of a sustained
Western impulse for trade and conquest.
In other words, the cultural subjugation,
elimination, and blending (however you slice it) in the name of a global
culture (in this example, Western capitalism) is nothing new. And I believe by
pointing to colonization and Western capitalism the authors are warning us that
the drive towards a global culture has dire consequences, and we should be
careful of jumping on the global culture wagon. The Western world has been at
the forefront of at every attempt of a global culture in history. It is
interesting how both cosmopolitanism and the Wikiworld are Western concepts, or
at least driven by Western concepts.
The
Wikiworld is driven by ICT’s which are products of Western capitalism. So is
this idea of a Wikiworld another globalized Western product being sold (or
outsourced) to the rest of the world, like capitalism? If I am reading Suoranta
and Vaden correctly, the correct answer is yes, but no. Yes, the Wikiworld
driven by consumers of ICT’s all over the globe is becoming globalized. But of
course it will never become a global phenomenon because the global corporations
who produce ICT’s will not allow it. Suoranta and Vaden ask “Is not the
technological control of the globe one with a specific model of society, namely
Western capitalism?” (152). Yes and that is why a truly global technological
culture, like the Wikiworld, will never be fully global in scale, because as
noted earlier it is the drive to create a global culture that is preventing
such a global culture from coming to fruition. In the process of creating a
global culture other cultures have to be subjugated and eliminated, and in the
process an under or counterculture is created, thereby hindering the global
culture process itself.
The
main reason why a Western global culture undermines it own existence is because
“the West sees the rest of the world as a resource, as a natural producer of
commodities” (Suoranta and Vaden 152). The most problematic aspect about this
is that “the last in the long chain of commodities is catastrophe, and the
accompanying catastrophe aid[s] industry” (Suoranta and Vaden 152). In other
words, the West is crating the ultimate decline of the west, along with the
decline of the rest of the world. By seeing the rest of the world as a producer
of commodities we are inedvedtedly creating the misery and poverty present in
the third world. To put it more succinctly:
Misery is reproduced as symbolic source, a necessary fuel for the
Western moral and sentimental balance. We are the consumers of this spectacle,
and the whole West feeds like cannibals on catastrophe mediated by news
broadcasting in their cynicaltone and our humanitarian help in a moralistic
mode. Baudrillard insists that we are just as dependent on this drug, produced
by the developing countries, as other drugs. (Baudrillard 1995, 84-85.) The
irony is that global capitalism is strong, dynamic and perverse enough to both
produce the drugs it needs and to outsource the misery to the others. (152)
This is the main difference between Appiah’s
cosmopolitanism and Suoranta and Vaden’s Wikiworld. That is to say that the
Wikiworld is consciously aware of the economic processes imbedded in the world,
and sees itself as part-and-parcel of that world (or at least sees that it’s
place in the world will be unique). Appiah refuses to see or recognize that a
global culture will never be possible, because cosmopolitanism, Wikiworld,
global culture, etc, leads to cultural subjugation. More importantly, he does
not realize that it is the Western world that creates and tolerates those
political institutions or nations that do not respect basic human rights and do
not meet “certain general ethical constraints”
(621).
Sourranta and Vaden
mention one concept that will most likely become part of the global culture in
the future:
If and when the new racism of the West is characterised by economic
divisions, securing the stability of the existing division, it is good to pay
attention to how information societies are protected from those seeking a
better living.
This new racism is nothing new. Although it
initially pointed to culture coded as racism. For example, when a culture
privileges one language over another the creation and practice of what Ronald
Schmidt in his article “Racialization and Language Policy: The Case of the USA”
has quoted as “New Racism” (154), or racism coded as culture is created. Under
New Racism “specific cultural forms have come to signify racialized identities,
particularly where traditional biologically-based racist attributions have
become socially and politically disreputable” (154). By systematically and
culturally privileging one language over another, in a multi-ethnic melting-pot
society such as America, the assimilationists (those against language policy)
are perpetuating an “unjust social inequality between different ethnolinguistic
groups that are equally American” (Schmidt 154). Furthermore, the concept of
equal treatment under the law is completely diminished when a state privileges
one language in a society that is essentially multilingual (Schmidt 154). This
brings us to an important point, that is that language just like literacy can
be utilized as a hierarchicalagent in a society. Furtehrmore, Souranta and
Vaden argue that economic divisions will soon be under the banner of New Racism
as well.
By placing greater
importance on one language and literacy, or one economic level over another we
are justifying racism and cultural prejudice, or at the very least
acknowledging linguistic, social, and cultural stratification are unequal
processes. By seeking an English-only policy and favoring a Western-only
literacy (or accepting the Great Divide theory) we are homogenizing language
and/or literacy. And soon income levels as well.
In the process of hierarchizing languages and literacies a
society might gain a common culture, such as an American common culture. By
prioritizing a language and form of literacy as superior than others a culture
will undoubtedly become defined as common. In other words, by hierarchizing we
are establishing what is culturally relevant and what is not. While this
process can be advantageous in purporting a national unified image abroad, it
can also lead to some disadvantages in a culture. For example, by defining what
is culturally relevant a culture might be further alienating those internally
colonized and furthermore, it might also lose that cultural openness that makes
it attractive to foreigners and immigrants alike. Souranta and Vaden are
pointing out that if we are not careful our perpetration of Western values
abroad will lead to New Racism under economic terms.
Works Cited
Appiah, Kwayne
Anthony. “Cosmopolitan Patriots.” Critical
Inquiry 23.3 (1997): 617-629.
McLean,
Cheryl A. “A Space Called Home: An Immigrant Adolescent’s Digital Literacy
Practices.” Journal of Adolescent and
Adult Literacy 54.1 (2010): 13-22.
Schmidt, Ronald Sr.
“Racialization and Language Policy: The Case of the USA.” Multilingua 21 (2002): 141-161.
Souranta, Juha and Tere
Vaden. Wikiworld: Political Economy of
Digital Literacy, and the Promise of Participator Media. Tampere, Finland: Paulo Freire Research Center, 2008.
[1]
What strikes as important in Appiah’s
concept, and where I think he missed a golden opportunity for insightful
research, is that Appiah seems to connotate that those “political institutions”
(621) that do not respect human dignity are non-Western. As Suoranta and Vaden
showcase, that is not necessarily the case. This interesting, if not
mind-boggling, point will be highlighted further in the differences section.